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Facts and Fallacies 
about U.S. FDI in China
Lee Branstetter and C. Fritz Foley
Everything you hear about China is true. But none of it is 
 accurate.
—Dr. John Frankenstein, Research Associate, Weatherhead 
East Asian Institute, Columbia University
In the late 1970s, China began to adopt economic policies that were more 
market oriented than policies it had pursued in the past, and this shift has 
been very successful in promoting economic growth.1 Rising levels of indus-
trial output have been accompanied by increases in foreign direct investment 
(FDI) inﬂ  ows, leading many to conclude that FDI has played an important 
role in China’s success. Since China’s oﬃcial entry to the World Trade Orga-
nization (WTO) in 2001, China’s economy has continued to expand rapidly, 
FDI inﬂ  ows have continued on a large scale, and China’s role in world trade 
has continued to increase.
These developments have heightened American public interest in China. 
Numerous recent books seek to explain the Chinese economy to the general 
reader, and the popular press has expanded its coverage of Chinese eco-
nomic developments. Despite this growing level of information, however, 
signiﬁ  cant misconceptions continue to cloud the popular understanding of 
the role of foreign ﬁ  rms in China, and, particularly, the role of U.S.-  based 
multinationals. Some of these misconceptions have even taken root in the 
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1. For extensive descriptions of the history of Chinese policy with respect to FDI, please see 
Branstetter and Lardy (2006, 2008), Lardy (2002), and Naughton (1996).514        Lee Branstetter and C. Fritz Foley
2. We are certainly not the ﬁ  rst observers to point this out. As an earlier FDI boom in China 
was cresting, Wei (2000b) argued that the levels were small given China’s size.
3. Because of oﬃcial restrictions on direct Taiwanese investment in the mainland, some Tai-
wanese FDI gets routed through Hong Kong or through “tax haven” nations such as the Cay-
man Islands. Such tax haven jurisdictions are a prominent component of the “other nations” 
category shown in ﬁ  gure 13.1. Some advanced countries also preferred to invest in China 
through Hong Kong- based subsidiaries, further exaggerating the apparent role played by Hong 
Kong. Finally, it is widely speculated that as much as one-  quarter of the FDI originating in 
Hong Kong consists of Chinese entrepreneurs investing through Hong Kong shell companies 
in order to qualify as FIEs for tax and other beneﬁ  ts.
thinking of professional economists who are outside the small community 
of China specialists.
In the late 1990s, when popular and professional interest in the general 
phenomenon of expanding FDI was increasing, Robert Feenstra (1999) 
wrote a useful article called “Facts and Fallacies about Foreign Direct Invest-
ment.” The article corrected a number of widely misconceptions about the 
subject. Inspired by his title as well as his approach, we seek to dispel four 
widely held beliefs about U.S. aﬃliate activity in China by using the most 
recent available data.
13.1      Fallacy Number 1: U.S. FDI in China Is Large
The attention paid to China and its economic engagement with the rest 
of the world has led many to conclude that it is a leading destination of U.S. 
FDI. Casual observers believe that China’s abundance of labor, high growth 
rates, and huge consumer markets attract large amounts of U.S. FDI. This 
view is even held by many corporate executives. A 2004 A. T. Kearney study 
found that China was perceived as the most favored location for FDI. The 
amount of capital ﬂ  owing to China from the United States in the form of 
FDI is thought to be suﬃcient to have a large eﬀect on Chinese capital for-
mation. However, data collected by Chinese statistical agencies indicate that 
U.S. FDI is a small component of total FDI in China, and data collected 
by U.S. agencies show that American ﬁ  rms’ investment in China is a small, 
albeit quickly growing, part of their total investment abroad.2
Statistics from the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of 
China track investment by approved foreign-  invested enterprises (FIEs) 
on an annual basis. Figure 13.1 breaks down this growth in investment by 
the nationality of the foreign owner or partial owner of the FIE.3 Prior to 
1989, FDI inﬂ  ows were limited and dominated by Hong Kong and Taiwan-
 based investors seeking to exploit opportunities in China’s special economic 
zones.
After the international unease generated by the Tiananmen Incident dis-
sipated, there was a sharp increase in FDI inﬂ  ows and a pronounced diver-
siﬁ  cation in its sources. It was in these years that Western countries and 
Japan began to enter the Chinese market in earnest. However, despite the Facts and Fallacies about U.S. FDI in China    5 1 5
growth, the role of American ﬁ  rms in these inﬂ  ows has been and remains 
relatively modest.
It is worth noting that even overall levels of FIE investment are modest. 
As indicated in ﬁ  gure 13.2, the share of ﬁ  xed asset investment performed by 
FIEs grew from near 0 percent to over 10 percent in the mid- 1990s, then fell 
slightly to the high single digits where it remains in the mid-  2000s. Foreign-
 invested enterprises accounted for less than 5 percent of urban employment 
in China in the middle of the current decade.
Fig. 13.1    FDI by source country
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, various issues
Fig. 13.2    Fixed asset investment by organizational form
Source: Data on the fraction of ﬁ  xed asset investment undertaken by state-  owned enterprises 
and foreign-  invested enterprises are taken from the China Statistical Yearbook, various issues.516        Lee Branstetter and C. Fritz Foley
4. The reported proﬁ  ts of U.S. aﬃliates in China have also grown rapidly, especially in recent 
years. Between the 1999 and 2004 benchmark surveys, net income grew nearly sevenfold. How-
ever, net income from Chinese aﬃliates only accounts for about 2 percent of the global net 
income of U.S. aﬃliates worldwide.
5. These employment ﬁ  gures need to be placed in some context. The total Chinese urban 
workforce in 2005 was 273 million persons. Foreign-  invested enterprises from all source coun-
tries collectively employed about 12.4 million persons, less than 5 percent of the total. Clearly, 
U.S. ﬁ  rms’ contribution to employment in China is vanishingly small.
Consideration of these facts provide an interesting perspective on the 
work of Dooley, Folkerts-  Landau, and Garber (2003, 2004a,b). These 
papers argue that Asian developing countries, including China, suﬀer from 
severe deﬁ  ciencies in their ﬁ  nancial systems that undermine the eﬃcient allo-
cation of domestic savings. As a consequence, these countries export capital 
to the United States, and this capital is then reinvested in Asian developing 
countries, including China, through multinational ﬁ  rms in the form of FDI. 
This type of investment is allocated in a relatively eﬃcient manner, and it 
generates industrial expansion in export-  related sectors and absorption of 
excess labor. Ju and Wei (2007) present a model that illustrates how ﬁ  nancial 
market imperfections in a developing country could generate capital exports 
to countries with better- developed ﬁ  nancial markets and substantial inﬂ  ows 
of FDI from those countries, even when there is free trade in goods that gives 
rise to a current account surplus.
However, the facts suggest that FDI in China does not exactly play the role 
assigned to it in this stream of research. Foreign-  invested enterprises ac-
count for relatively little investment or employment generation in contempo-
rary China, and American investment is but a minor component of that 
small contribution. As described in the following section, American FDI 
is focused on the domestic market rather than exports back to the United 
States, and U.S. aﬃliates tap Chinese sources of funds to ﬁ  nance their activi-
ties. The largest share of FDI inﬂ  ows appear to come from other Asian coun-
tries whose own ﬁ  nancial systems exhibit varying levels of development.
Just as American ﬁ  rms collectively account for a relatively small compo-
nent of FDI in China, American investment in China accounts for a rela-
tively small portion of total U.S. multinational activity around the world. 
Table 13.1 shows 2004 total assets, sales, and employment of U.S. aﬃliates 
in China and in four regions that are the major destinations of U.S. FDI. 
China’s share of U.S. multinational enterprise (MNE) total aﬃliate sales and 
assets were 1.9 percent and 0.7 percent, respectively, in 2004. Although the 
compound annual growth rate of U.S. MNE sales in China over the 1982 
to 2004 period exceeds 40 percent, this rapid growth has proceeded from 
a small base, and it has taken place in a context of growing multinational 
activity worldwide.4 Chinese aﬃliates comprise 4.5 percent of U.S. total 
aﬃliate employment, which is a larger share than their share of assets and 
sales, suggesting that work performed in China is relatively labor- intensive.5 Facts and Fallacies about U.S. FDI in China    5 1 7
6. We are extremely grateful to Nicholas Lardy for a series of detailed discussions that clari-
ﬁ  ed our understanding of Chinese statistics on FDI, including the degree to which it may reﬂ  ect 
investment ﬁ  nanced by local borrowing.
As the data in table 13.1 illustrates, most U.S. MNE activity takes place in 
other developed countries like Canada and countries in Europe.
Although the data from both Chinese and U.S. sources indicate levels of 
FDI that are smaller than the popular press suggests, there are signiﬁ  cant 
discrepancies between data from these sources. The most comparable data 
sets attempt to provide measures of FDI ﬂ  ows as opposed to measures of 
MNE operating activity. Table 13.2 presents estimates of U.S. FDI outﬂ  ows 
to China produced by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and Chinese 
Ministry of Commerce estimates of U.S. FDI inﬂ  ows into China from the 
United States over the 1994 to 2005 period. In each year, Chinese Ministry 
of Commerce estimates exceed the BEA estimates, often by a factor of more 
than 2.
A number of measurement issues could be important in explaining this 
discrepancy. First, the Ministry of Commerce reports measures of “actually 
utilized investment” by FIEs, and these measures may include investment 
that is ﬁ  nanced by capital ﬂ  ows from the foreign parent as well as investment 
that is ﬁ  nanced through local sources, including borrowing from local banks.6 
Foreign- invested enterprises are surveyed regarding their investments. If the 
surveys do not precisely capture diﬀerences between investment ﬁ  nanced 
by retained earnings, capital transfers from the parent, investment funds 
provided by a local partner, and investment ﬁ  nanced by local borrowing, 
this could result in oﬃcial Chinese FDI ﬂ  ow measures that are larger than 
the corresponding U.S. measures. When individual investment projects rely 
on investment from multiple sources, correct attribution could be diﬃcult, 
generating such measurement problems. While we cannot point to ﬁ  rm evi-
dence quantifying the existence of this particular source of measurement 
Table 13.1  Measures of U.S. multinational aﬃliate activity in 2004
    No. of aﬃliates   Sales   Assets   Employment
China 688 71,721 63,783 455
Europe 12,367 1,909,697 5,376,372 4,291
Canada 1,839 442,607 634,677 1,092
Latin America and other 
Western Hemisphere 3,693 417,185 1,208,716 1,936
Asia and Paciﬁ  c 5,093 886,596 1,362,061 2,396
Total aﬃliate activity   23,928   3,768,733   8,757,063   10,028
Notes: These data are drawn from preliminary published results of BEA’s 2004 Benchmark 
Survey of U.S. Direct Investment Abroad. They cover all nonbank aﬃliates of nonbank U.S. 
parents. Sales and assets are in millions of U.S. dollars; employment is in thousands.518        Lee Branstetter and C. Fritz Foley
7. Scholarship critical of the eﬃciency of Chinese ﬁ  nancial institutions includes Lardy 
(1998), Tsai (2002), and Branstetter (2007), among many other sources.
8. Desai, Foley, and Hines (2004a) document that multinationals tend to make extensive use 
of parent provided capital in countries with poor ﬁ  nancial development, and Antràs, Desai, and 
Foley (2007) provide a theoretical explanation for why this would be the case. This regularity 
does not seem to be prevalent in China.
error, U.S. data on the ﬁ  nancing patterns of U.S. aﬃliates in China suggests 
that it could play a role.
Table 13.3 provides some indication of how important local sources 
of capital are for foreign ﬁ  rms in China. In 2004, only 70 percent of U.S. 
aﬃliates based in China were wholly owned. Joint ventures often involve a 
local partner who provides equity capital as well as other inputs, and these 
types of organizational forms are more prevalent in China than in the other 
regions displayed in the table. Slightly more than one half of the assets of 
U.S. aﬃliates based in China are ﬁ  nanced with debt, and 61 percent of this 
debt is provided by local sources. The widely documented shortcomings of 
Chinese ﬁ  nancial markets make it surprising that Chinese lenders would 
ﬁ  gure so prominently.7 However, given the hazards attending other classes 
of borrowers, the local subsidiaries of foreign multinationals can be seen as 
relatively creditworthy borrowers, ultimately backed by deep-  pocketed for-
eign parents, and in possession of brand name and technological advantages 
over potential domestic competitors. Loans from the parent are 19 percent 
of total debt. While this share exceeds shares of intraﬁ  rm debt elsewhere 
around the world, it is still fairly small.8 If funds obtained locally are counted 
Table 13.2  U.S. and Chinese estimates of foreign direct investment (FDI) ﬂ  ows from 
the United States to China












  2005  1,613   3,061  
Notes: This table presents data on aggregate annual FDI ﬂ  ows from the United States to 
China. The U.S. data are taken from U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis publications. These 
data are compared with the data reported by the Chinese Ministry of Commerce on invest-
ment by foreign ﬁ  rms with U.S. parents for the same years; the Chinese data are taken from 
various years of the China Statistical Yearbook. Both series are reported in millions of U.S. 
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9. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) issued a brieﬁ  ng 
pointing out this and other issues regarding Chinese FDI data and the challenges involved in 
comparing Chinese FDI statistics with those of other sources. See UNCTAD (2007).
10. We thank Shang-  Jin Wei and Robert Feenstra for suggesting that we explore this ques-
tion.
11. For a detailed explanation of these data, see Mataloni (1995).
when computing FDI ﬂ  ows from the United States to China in the Chinese 
data but not the U.S. data, the oﬃcial Chinese statistics can be viewed as 
overstating the contribution of U.S. ﬁ  rms to Chinese investment.
A second factor that might contribute to the discrepancy concerns how 
source countries are determined in FDI ﬂ  ow data. In the U.S. data, any 
capital ﬂ  ow from the parent company to an aﬃliate in China through a 
holding company located in a third country is captured as a outﬂ  ow from the 
United States to the third country, not from the United States to China. The 
exact procedures followed by Chinese statistical authorities are not clear, 
and it is possible that data collectors use information about the ultimate 
nationality of foreign investors to classify some of the FDI routed through 
tax haven holding companies according to the nationality of the ultimate 
parent. The fact that Chinese oﬃcial statistics continue to measure large 
inﬂ  ows from tax haven jurisdictions suggests that this is unlikely to explain 
much of the discrepancy, but it could conceivably explain some.
Diﬀerences in measured FDI inﬂ  ows could also be a consequence of other 
deviations between Chinese and international statistical practice. The view 
that much of the discrepancy lies in diﬀerences in statistical practice was 
strengthened recently by massive revisions of the Chinese government’s own 
oﬃcial estimates of the net inward FDI stock. Beginning in 2005, the Min-
istry of Commerce released revised estimates of China’s net FDI stock that 
reduced its size by a half. Previous estimates of the stock had been based on 
accumulated inﬂ  ows, and these data may not have captured reductions in 
FDI capital provided by foreigners. The new, revised FDI stock measures 
are not broken down by source country, but the magnitude of this revision 
amounts to an admission that the previously reported ﬁ  gures were far too 
high and suggests that the true level of FDI may lie closer to that indicated 
by U.S. data.9 Given this, and the extent to which, even in the Chinese data, 
U.S. FDI is a relatively small component of cumulated total inﬂ  ows, we are 
quite conﬁ  dent in our conclusions regarding the relative size of U.S. FDI 
in China.
In order to explore why U.S. FDI in China appears to be small, we run 
gravity speciﬁ  cations to explain levels of U.S. MNE activity by country.10 In 
these tests, we use conﬁ  dential data from BEA’s 2004 Benchmark Survey of 
U.S. Direct Investment Abroad on the operations of majority-  owned non-
bank aﬃliates of nonbank U.S. parents, which we aggregate to the country 
level.11 We employ three diﬀerent measures of U.S. MNE activity as depen-
dant variables, the log of aﬃliate sales, the log of aﬃliate assets, and the log Facts and Fallacies about U.S. FDI in China    5 2 1
12. We analyze employment compensation instead of employment because diﬀerences in 
labor productivity make it diﬃcult to compare levels of employment across countries.
of aﬃliate employment compensation. Our baseline speciﬁ  cation controls 
for geographic distance from the United States and the log of gross domes-
tic product (GDP; measured at market exchange rates). It also includes a 
China dummy that is equal to 1 for China and zero for other countries. If 
the coeﬃcient on the China dummy is negative, this would indicate that 
measures of U.S. MNE activity in China are lower in China than a simple 
gravity speciﬁ  cation would suggest they should be.
Once we have estimates from this baseline speciﬁ  cation, we include other 
country characteristics that could explain the extent to which U.S. MNEs 
engage in activity in China. Given the potential importance of taxes and 
corruption noted by Desai, Foley, and Hines (2004b) and Wei (2000a), we 
include a measure of each country’s corporate income tax rate and the cor-
ruption index taken from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 
political risk data set. In order to control for factors related to levels of 
wealth and economic development more generally, we also include the log of 
GDP per capita (measured at market exchange rates). Descriptive statistics 
for the data used in the analysis presented in table 13.5, as well as the analysis 
presented in table 13.7, appear in table 13.4.
The results of the gravity speciﬁ  cations appear in table 13.5. The depen-
dent variable used in columns (1) to (4) is the log of aﬃliate sales, in (5) to 
(8) is the log of aﬃliate assets, and in (9) to (12) is the log of aﬃliate employ-
ment compensation.12 Our baseline speciﬁ  cations appear in columns (1), 
(5), and (9). In each of these, the coeﬃcient on the log of distance is nega-
tive and signiﬁ  cant, and the coeﬃcient on the log of GDP is positive and 
signiﬁ  cant. These ﬁ  ndings are consistent with previous work and indicate 
that U.S. MNEs engage in more activity in larger countries that are closer 
to the United States.
In each of the baseline speciﬁ  cations, the coeﬃcient on the China dummy 
is negative and signiﬁ  cant. In interpreting these results, it is important to 
keep in mind that China is a large country that is located a considerable dis-
tance from the United States. The log of GDP for China is about 2 standard 
deviations above the mean value in the sample, and the log of distance from 
the United States is about 1 standard deviation above the mean. Therefore, 
China’s size implies that it should attract a signiﬁ  cant amount of foreign 
investment, and its location tempers this implication. The estimated China 
dummy coeﬃcients point out that levels of U.S. MNE activity in China are 
lower than would be predicted by a simple model in which levels of MNE 
activity vary with distance and country size.
The speciﬁ  cations in columns (2), (6), and (10) of table 13.5 include mea-
sures of corporate tax rates. This variable is not signiﬁ  cant in these speci-
ﬁ  cations, and its inclusion does not change the negative coeﬃcient on the 522        Lee Branstetter and C. Fritz Foley
13. This ﬁ  nding conﬁ  rms earlier work by Wei (2000a) pointing to the negative impact of 
Chinese corruption on FDI inﬂ  ows.
China dummy very much. Controlling for corruption, as in columns (3), 
(7), and (11), reduces the magnitude and signiﬁ  cance of the China dummy. 
This dummy becomes insigniﬁ  cant although still negative in column (3) and 
marginally signiﬁ  cant in column (11), while the coeﬃcient on the corruption 
index is positive and signiﬁ  cant. China has a corruption index of 2 on a scale 
of 0 to 6, where higher numbers imply lower levels of corruption. These 
results suggest that China’s low level of U.S. MNE activity is at least in part 
a consequence of corruption or a factor that is correlated with corruption.13 
The speciﬁ  cations presented in columns (4), (8), and (12) also include the 
log of GDP per capita. Once this variable is included, the coeﬃcient on the 
China dummy is no longer signiﬁ  cant. These results indicate that U.S. MNE 
activity is actually not lower than one would expect if one accounts for the 
fact that per capita income is low in China and corruption is high.
While caution is surely warranted in using regression coeﬃcients derived 
from cross-  sectional evidence to make predictions about the evolution of 
economic variables over time, it is interesting to consider what our regres-
sion coeﬃcients imply about the future of U.S. FDI in China. Given its 
rapid rate of current economic growth, it is likely that per capita income 
Table 13.4  Descriptive statistics
    Mean   Median   Standard deviation
Log of aﬃliate sales 14.8417 14.7465 2.5201
Log of aﬃliate assets 15.2026 15.2270 2.7386
Log of aﬃliate employment compensation 12.1616 12.1126 2.7121
Log of aﬃliate sales outside host country 12.4630 13.4019 4.7275
Share of sales to countries other than host 
country and the U.S.
0.2719 0.2105 0.2390
Share of sales to the U.S. 0.0785 0.0290 0.1250
Log of distance 8.4632 8.4972 0.5089
Log of GDP 24.3406 23.8887 1.8934
Country tax rate 0.2143 0.2354 0.1319
Corruption index 2.5636 2.4792 1.1395
Log of GDP per capita   8.0364   8.0819   1.5652
Notes: This table presents descriptive statistics for variables used in the analysis of 2004 U.S. 
multinational aﬃliate activity aggregated to the country level. Sales, assets, and employment 
compensation are measured in thousands of U.S. dollars. The log of distance is the log of 
distance between U.S. and aﬃliate host-  country capital cities measured in miles. The log of 
GDP and the log of GDP per capita measure host-  country gross domestic product and gross 
domestic product per capita, respectively, and these variables are drawn from the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators. The country tax rate is a measure of the median eﬀective cor-
porate tax rate paid by U.S. multinationals in a host country. The corruption index is an index 
of corruption that ranges from 0 to 6, with lower numbers indicating higher levels of corrup-
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14. The work of Dooley, Folkerts- Landau, and Garber (2003, 2004a,b) and Ju and Wei (2007) 
assigns an important role to Chinese ﬁ  nancial imperfections in generating capital outﬂ  ows and 
FDI inﬂ  ows. While severe imperfections remain in Chinese ﬁ  nancial markets, many indicators 
show marked signs of improvement over the past decade. This has not been associated with a 
decline in measured FDI inﬂ  ows—in fact, FDI inﬂ  ows have expanded substantially in abso-
lute terms, possibly suggesting the dominating eﬀects of gravity factors rather than ﬁ  nancial 
imperfection.
15. Earlier versions of the Dooley, Folkerts- Landau, and Garber (2003) hypothesis assigned 
an important role to U.S. investment in aﬃliates’ export production.
16. See Burke (2000).
and aggregate GDP in China will rise sharply over the next ten years. If the 
overall Chinese economy were to maintain growth rates of 10 percent per 
year over the next decade, the combined eﬀects of the estimated coeﬃcients 
on GDP and GDP per capita would predict that U.S. aﬃliate sales in China 
would more than triple.14
13.2      Fallacy Number 2: U.S. FDI in China Is Export-  Oriented
As the U.S.-  China trade deﬁ  cit has grown in recent years, a number of 
commentators have suggested that it has been driven by U.S. purchases of 
goods produced by U.S. aﬃliates in China.15 For example, in a 2000 brieﬁ  ng 
paper for the Economic Policy Institute, James Burke wrote, “The activi-
ties of U.S. multinational ﬁ  rms, together with China’s protectionist trade 
policies, have had a signiﬁ  cant role in increasing the U.S. trade deﬁ  cit with 
China.”16
Foreign ﬁ  rms in China have indeed played an increasingly dominant role 
in China’s trade. Figure 13.3 shows the role of foreign ﬁ  rms in Chinese 
imports and exports, respectively. In a period in which Chinese exports and 
imports have been growing rapidly, these shares have been rising. By 2000, 
the share of FIEs in Chinese exports had reached more than 50 percent, and 
it continued to expand. Clearly, FIEs have accounted for a disproportion-
ately large share of export growth during the years in which China has come 
to loom so large in world trade.
What role do U.S. aﬃliates play in this incredible surge of export growth? 
Almost none. Table 13.6 presents statistics on the extent to which U.S. 
aﬃliates in China sell their goods to customers located in the United States 
and the extent to which they trade with the United States. The data illus-
trate that in 2004, about $39.7 billion of local aﬃliate sales were directed 
to the local market, and only $3.7 billion were directed to the U.S. market. 
The growth in exports from Chinese aﬃliates to the United States and to 
third countries has been explosive, but their scale remains small. In 2004, 
U.S. exports to aﬃliates in China and U.S. imports from aﬃliates in China 
comprised less than 5 percent of aﬃliate sales. These facts are not consistent 
with the hypothesis that U.S. aﬃliates operating in China are contributing 
to the large U.S. trade deﬁ  cit by producing there and selling back to the Facts and Fallacies about U.S. FDI in China    5 2 5
17. These ﬁ  gures were obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau Web site at http://www.census 
.gov/foreign- trade/balance/c5700.html#2004. In 1999, U.S. exports to China totaled about $13 
billion, and imports from China were almost $82 billion.
18. See Anderson (2006), from whom the statistics in this paragraph and the next are taken. 
The language here closely follows his.
United States. Intraﬁ  rm trade by U.S. multinationals does not loom nearly 
as large in intermediating U.S.-  China trade as the overall role of FIEs in 
Chinese trade might suggest. In fact, a comparison of the total exports to 
and imports from China ascribed to U.S. multinationals seems rather small 
in comparison to the magnitudes of bilateral trade ﬂ  ows in 2004. Total U.S. 
imports from China were $196.7 billion, and total U.S. exports were $34.7 
billion.17 U.S. imports and exports between U.S. aﬃliates in China and their 
U.S. parents were $2.6 billion and $2.5 billion, respectively.
What is true of U.S. multinationals seems broadly true of multinationals 
from other Western countries. Every year, the Chinese Ministry of Com-
merce publishes a list of the top 200 largest mainland Chinese ﬁ  rms by 
export value. The 200 ﬁ  rms included in the 2005 list accounted for one- third 
of total mainland exports in that year, providing a useful, if incomplete, 
sample of important exporting ﬁ  rms of all nationalities. Inspection of this 
list suggests that the total share of U.S., European, and Japanese multina-
tionals in the exports of the top 200 is only 11 percent.18 The majority of 
ﬁ  rms in this list are indeed foreign invested, but the foreigners hail from 
Taiwan, Hong Kong, and South Korea. Like American ﬁ  rms, the leading 
European multinationals in China appear to be focused primarily on the 
Fig. 13.3    The role of FIEs in China’s exports and imports
Source: Data measure the share of export value and import value accounted by foreign- 
invested enterprises. Data are taken from the China Statistical Yearbook, various issues526        Lee Branstetter and C. Fritz Foley
19. See Anderson (2006).
domestic market, not exports. The Chinese export miracle largely reﬂ  ects 
the activity of the foreign aﬃliates of ﬁ  rms based in Asia’s other newly 
industrialized countries.
The role played by Japanese ﬁ  rms in Chinese exports appears to lie some-
where in between the roles played by Western ﬁ  rms and ﬁ  rms headquartered 
in developing countries in Asia. Ahn, Fukao, and Ito (2007) have used Japa-
nese data and South Korean data to undertake an extensive study of the 
role played by these ﬁ  rms’ aﬃliates in regional trade ﬂ  ows. Because many 
Japanese ﬁ  rms route their exports through Hong Kong, these authors aggre-
gate Chinese and Hong Kong trade statistics. They ﬁ  nd that the exports of 
Japanese ﬁ  rms’ Chinese aﬃliates collectively account for nearly 41 percent 
of total Chinese/Hong Kong exports to Japan. Likewise, about 30 percent of 
total Japanese exports to China go to the Chinese aﬃliates of Japanese ﬁ  rms. 
The relatively greater role of Japanese aﬃliates in mediating Japan-  China 
trade is likely to be related to geographic proximity and history. China is the 
closest major economy to Japan, and many Japanese companies were quite 
active in parts of China prior to the end of World War II.
The limited role played by U.S. ﬁ  rms in mediating U.S.-  China trade is 
surprising given the extent to which large U.S. retail chains distribute Chi-
nese goods. According to some estimates, Wal-  Mart accounts for almost 
$20 billion of Chinese exports to the United States. However, Wal- Mart and 
other large-  scale U.S. retailers typically procure their goods from China-
 based export- oriented manufacturing plants that are not U.S.- owned to any 
signiﬁ  cant degree.19 They tend to purchase from the same Taiwanese, Hong 
Table 13.6  Aﬃliate sales, by destination and trade activity
    1989   1994   1999   2004
U.S. multinational aﬃliate sales
Sales to the United States 1 219 2,703 3,694
Local sales 242 2,520 14,306 39,719
Sales to other foreign countries 13 486 3,371 11,293
U.S. exports of goods to aﬃliates
Total 39 371 3,103 2,974
Shipped by U.S. parents 35 288 2,529 2,541
Shipped by unaﬃliated U.S. persons 4 83 574 433
U.S. imports of goods shipped by aﬃliates
Total 1 448 2,640 3,188
Shipped to U.S. parents 1 403 1,778 2,640
Shipped to unaﬃliated U.S. persons  n.a.   45   862   548
Notes: These data are drawn from published results of BEA’s benchmark surveys of U.S. di-
rect investment abroad for 1989, 1994, 1999, and 2004. The data only cover majority-  owned 
nonbank Chinese aﬃliates of nonbank U.S. parents. Sales, exports, and imports are measured 
in millions of U.S. dollars. n.a. indicates that the value is not available.Facts and Fallacies about U.S. FDI in China    5 2 7
Kong, and Korean ﬁ  rms they sourced from a decade or two ago, except that 
the ﬁ  nal production is now based in mainland China.
In order to explore in more detail if U.S. aﬃliates based in China are more 
focused on serving the local market than one should expect, we again make 
use of gravity speciﬁ  cations. In table 13.7, we report results of tests that are 
identical to those presented in table 13.5 except that dependant variables 
measure the extent to which U.S. aﬃliates based in diﬀerent countries focus 
on serving markets outside of their host country. These tests use data aggre-
gated to the country level for the year 2004.
The dependent variable used in columns (1) to (4) of table 13.7 is the log 
of aﬃliate sales to persons outside the aﬃliate’s host country; in (5) to (8) 
it is the share of aﬃliate sales to persons outside the host country and the 
United States, and in (9) to (12) it is the share of aﬃliate sales to persons 
in the United States. Our baseline speciﬁ  cations are given in columns (1), 
(5), and (9), and these include the log of distance from the United States, 
host-  country GDP, and a China dummy as controls. The coeﬃcient on the 
China dummy in column (1) is negative and marginally signiﬁ  cant; it is 
negative and signiﬁ  cant in column (5), but it is positive and insigniﬁ  cant in 
column (9). The negative coeﬃcients on the China dummy in speciﬁ  cations 
explaining the log of aﬃliate sales outside the host country and the share of 
sales to countries other than the host country and the United States could be 
misleading if third- country markets were inconvenient to serve from China. 
However, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are all large markets that are 
reasonably close by. Taken together, there is only some evidence that U.S. 
aﬃliates in China are less focused on serving consumers outside their host 
country than are U.S. aﬃliates elsewhere. In fact, the share of sales to per-
sons in the United States is not lower than one would expect once country 
size and distance from the United States are taken into account.
Levels of sales to countries other than the host country are higher for 
aﬃliates located closer to the United States and for aﬃliates in larger coun-
tries. Shares of sales to persons in the United States are higher for aﬃliates 
located closer to the United States, but distance from the United States does 
not, perhaps unsurprisingly, aﬀect the share of sales to persons in countries 
other than host countries and the United States. The log of GDP is also not 
signiﬁ  cant in explaining shares of sales to the United States or countries 
other than the host country and the United States.
Adding corporate tax rates to our speciﬁ  cations reduces the coeﬃcients 
on the China dummy. The negative coeﬃcients on this dummy presented in 
columns (2) and (6) of table 13.7 are both statistically signiﬁ  cant. The nega-
tive coeﬃcients on host- country tax rates imply that sales to persons outside 
the host country are higher in low tax countries. Tax rates faced by multina-
tionals are relatively low in China. Therefore, accounting for corporate tax 
rates would lead one to predict that aﬃliates based in China should be more 
focused on serving markets outside of China. When we add the corruption 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Facts and Fallacies about U.S. FDI in China    5 2 9
signiﬁ  cant in columns (3) and (7), indicating that aﬃliates in countries with 
less corruption sell more output outside the host country. Once this variable 
is included, none of the coeﬃcients on the China dummy are signiﬁ  cant. 
The speciﬁ  cations presented in columns (4), (8), and (12) also include a 
control for the log of GDP per capita. In each of these speciﬁ  cations, the 
coeﬃcient on the China dummy is positive, although these coeﬃcients are 
not signiﬁ  cant. These results suggest that once one accounts for levels of 
corruption and country wealth, as well as tax rates, distance, and country 
size, U.S. aﬃliates in China are not less export oriented than aﬃliates based 
in other countries.
13.3      Fallacy Number 3: U.S. Multinational Investment 
in China Displaces Investment Elsewhere
U.S. workers often express concerns about increased competition from 
workers located in countries like China. Given the vast supply of labor in 
China, the low costs of production, and the alleged existence of techno-
logically skilled workers, few employees outside of China feel secure. In the 
extreme, these concerns would predict that increased activity in China by U.S. 
multinationals would displace activities that had been performed elsewhere.
The results of the previous sections suggest these concerns may be mis-
placed. As we have already demonstrated, levels of U.S. aﬃliate activity 
in China are modest. Furthermore, these aﬃliates have been and remain 
focused on the Chinese market. Given this, one would not expect increased 
activity in China to displace activity in other countries to a signiﬁ  cant degree. 
However, we can approach this question much more directly. Using the BEA 
data, it is possible to see if multinationals that expand employment in China 
cut it at home or among their other aﬃliates. The data presented in table 13.8 
address this issue by providing number counts of incidents in which ﬁ  rms 
that increase or decrease employment in China increase or decrease employ-
ment in other locations. The data include observations computed using ﬁ  rm-
 level data from the 1989, 1994, 1999, and 2004 benchmark survey results, so 
there are three periods over which increases and decreases are considered, 
the 1989 to 1994, 1994 to 1999, and 1999 to 2004 periods. Entries into China 
by existing multinationals are counted as increases in employment in China, 
and exits from China are counted as decreases.
The data in the top panel reﬂ  ect the growth in employment that has taken 
place among Chinese aﬃliates of U.S. multinationals. It also points out 
that ﬁ  rms that expand in China are almost as likely to expand employment 
domestically as they are to cut it. This evidence is not what one would expect 
if growth in China were strictly displacing activity in the United States. The 
bottom panel displays similar data, but instead of considering the trade-  oﬀ 
between activity in China and activity in the United States, it considers the 
trade- oﬀ between activity in China and activity among other aﬃliates. It 530        Lee Branstetter and C. Fritz Foley
20. This speech by Barrett was widely noted at the time. See http://money.cnn.com/2003/10/03/
technology/barrett/index.htm.
21. See also the discussion of this trend in the 2005 World Investment Report published by 
UNCTAD.
appears that ﬁ  rms that are increasing employment in China are increasing, 
and not decreasing, it elsewhere. Although somewhat crude, these statistics 
suggest that at least extreme notions that would give rise to concerns of 
multinational employees in the United States and elsewhere in the world 
are unfounded.
13.4      Fallacy Number 4: U.S. Multinationals Are Aggressively 
Exploiting China’s Growing Technological Prowess
In the United States, China is often perceived as being an emerging tech-
nological superpower. Industrialists, economists, and policymakers believe 
that China is becoming an attractive location to perform innovative activity. 
In 2003, Intel chief executive oﬃcer (CEO) Craig Barrett identiﬁ  ed China’s 
rising technological strength as constituting a competitive threat to U.S.-
 based  high- technology  industries.20 Harvard economist Richard Freeman 
(2006) has outlined the potential consequences of the globalization of 
the science and engineering workforce for America’s historical pattern of 
comparative advantage in high-  technology industries. Freeman points to 
the striking rise in the number of multinational research and development 
(R&D) centers in China—more than 700 by the end of 2004—and argues 
that this is only the harbinger of greater reallocation yet to come.21 Puga and 
Treﬂ er (2005) point to the rise of R&D activity in China and declare that the 
economics profession should “wake up and smell the ginseng!” In its 2005 
annual survey of global FDI trends, the World Investment Report produced 
by UNCTAD highlighted the internationalization of R&D and singled out 
Table 13.8  Changes in aﬃliate employment in China and changes in ﬁ  rm 
employment elsewhere
  





        Increase   Decrease   Increase   Decrease
Change in employment
 in  China
   Increase 203 213 316 155
Decrease   27    74    42    84
Notes: This table present number counts of the incidents in which changes in a ﬁ  rm’s employ-
ment in China are associated with changes in the ﬁ  rm’s employment in the United States and 
among its other aﬃliates. Changes are measured over three distinct time periods, 1989–1994, 
1994–1999, and 1999–2004.Facts and Fallacies about U.S. FDI in China    5 3 1
22. However, Schott (2008) qualiﬁ  es this ﬁ  nding by documenting a decline in the prices of 
Chinese exports relative to Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
exports of similar products.
23. This fraction takes as its denominator the sum of expenditures on R&D preformed 
by the U.S. parent and the R&D expenditures performed by all aﬃliates of U.S. ﬁ  rms in all 
countries.
the growth of foreign R&D centers in China as a development of particular 
signiﬁ  cance. Management scholar Minyuan Zhao (2004) has studied the 
patents generated by these centers for clues as to how American multination-
als have apparently learned to engage in large- scale, sophisticated R&D in a 
national context with notoriously weak intellectual property rights.
Proponents of the view that China is quickly emerging as a favorable loca-
tion for high- tech activity often point to evidence on the growing sophistica-
tion of China’s exports as proof of their claims. Schott (2008), for example, 
ﬁ  nds that over time Chinese exports exhibit rising sophistication relative 
to countries with similar aggregate endowments.22 Rodrik (2006) ﬁ  nds an 
unusually high degree of technological sophistication in China’s export pat-
tern. Cui and Syed (2007) suggest that recent changes in China’s trade pat-
terns indicate that it is rapidly becoming a surprisingly mature economy. 
Preeg (2004), a researcher with the Manufacturers Alliance, charges that 
China’s emergence as a major supplier of information technology, com-
munication, and electronic products poses a major challenge to U.S. com-
mercial and security interests.
Several considerations suggest these views are overblown. First, the extent 
of innovative activity performed in China by U.S. multinationals is sur-
prisingly modest. Table 13.9 provides 2004 data on expenditures for R&D 
performed by U.S. aﬃliates in China, U.S. aﬃliates based in other regions, 
and the U.S.-  based parent operations of U.S. MNEs. Only $622 million 
was spent by U.S. MNEs on R&D in China, an amount that is about three-
  tenths of 1 percent of the total R&D undertaken globally by U.S. MNEs.23 
Nearly 85 percent of R&D performed by U.S. multinationals in 2004 was 
performed by the U.S.-  based parent company. Less than 13 percent of the 
$4.9 billion of the R&D that U.S. multinationals performed in the Asia and 
Paciﬁ  c region was performed in China.
U.S. patent data also indicate that China’s innovative capability is more 
limited than some have suggested and that U.S. ﬁ  rms are not performing 
very much innovative activity there. Anyone seeking to protect intellectual 
property within the borders of the United States must apply for patent pro-
tection from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Oﬃce (U.S. PTO). Given the 
importance of the U.S. economy to the world in general and to China in par-
ticular, it is reasonable to regard patents taken out by China- based inventors 
in the United States as a useful indicator of inventive activity. The CASSIS 
CD-  ROM produced by the U.S. PTO provides information about U.S. pat-
ents, and we use the December 2006 version to produce ﬁ  gure 13.4.532        Lee Branstetter and C. Fritz Foley
24. Nearly 40 percent of China- generated U.S. patents identify inventors based in at least one 
other country. In contrast, nearly 90 percent of U.S. patents granted to U.S. ﬁ  rms in the last 
three years are generated by inventors based solely in the United States, and a similar percentage 
of Japan-  generated U.S. patents represent the product of only Japanese inventors.
Figure 13.4 tracks China-  generated patents in various categories over 
time. The dramatic growth in patenting over time is evident in this graph, but 
levels of patenting activity remain low. From the beginning of 2000 to the 
end of 2006, the U.S. PTO granted 3,447 patents to inventors based in China 
or teams of inventors that included at least one member with a Chinese 
address. Over the same period, inventors with ties to Japan received nearly 
241,000 patents, inventors with ties to Taiwan received over 39,000 patents, 
and inventors with ties to Israel received over 8,000 patents.
It is informative to break out patents generated in China into patents in 
which all listed inventors at the time of invention were based in China and 
also to break out patents that were assigned to U.S. corporate entities. As 
ﬁ  gure 13.4 indicates, a large and growing fraction of patents with Chinese 
inventors reﬂ  ect collaborative work with inventors located elsewhere.24 U.S. 
corporate entities appear to be associated with fewer than 1,000 granted 
patents, and only a relatively small percentage of China-  generated patents 
assigned to U.S. multinationals reﬂ  ect the inventive input of a purely Chi-
nese team of inventors. This could indicate a deliberate attempt on the part 
of U.S. R&D centers in China to conduct research that only has value when 
combined with a complementary research input from the United States or 
from another relatively advanced country. Zhao (2006) describes this strat-
egy as a way for U.S.-  based multinationals to cope with the poor intellec-
tual property rights regime in China. Another interpretation is that Chinese 
scientists and engineers, despite impressive levels of raw talent and basic 
skills, ﬁ  nd it diﬃcult to innovate eﬀectively at the technological frontier on 
Table 13.9  U.S. multinational enterprise research and development expenditures




Latin America and other Western Hemisphere 882
Asia and Paciﬁ  c 4,934
Total aﬃliate activity 27,529
  Parent activity   152,384  
These data are drawn from the preliminary published results of the 2004 BEA Survey of U.S. 
Direct Investment Abroad. The aﬃliate data only cover majority- owned nonbank aﬃliates of 
nonbank parents, and the parent activity measure covers all nonbank parents of nonbank 
aﬃliates. Research and development expenditures are measured in millions of U.S. dollars.Facts and Fallacies about U.S. FDI in China    5 3 3
25. One can combine the patent data with the R&D data to generate crude estimates of the 
patents per R&D dollar generated by U.S. aﬃliate R&D spending in China and compare that 
to the patents per R&D dollar generated by R&D spending by the parent ﬁ  rm in the United 
States. According to our estimates, the ratio of U.S. patents per R&D dollar in China is less 
than half this ratio in the United States. This diﬀerence is consistent with the view that the 
R&D conducted in Chinese aﬃliates tends to be more focused on modiﬁ  cation of the parent 
ﬁ  rm’s technology for the Chinese market or the development of technology speciﬁ  cally for 
that market than it is on the kind of fundamental, strategically sensitive research conducted 
in the parents’ own labs.
their own and often require the input of R&D managers and experts based 
elsewhere in the world to go beyond the existing state of the art.
It is also possible to use the U.S. PTO data to assess the importance of 
China, relative to other countries, in generating patents for U.S. ﬁ  rms and to 
examine which ﬁ  rms do have inventors based in China. There are 120 U.S. 
corporate assignees who have been granted at least two patents for which at 
least one inventor was based in China. The Chinese patents of these ﬁ  rms 
comprise only slightly more than 1 percent of the annual patenting activity 
of these ﬁ  rms in 2006.25
By far, the leading U.S. ﬁ  rm, in terms of China-  generated patents, is 
Microsoft. Table 13.10 lists the top ten corporate assignees in terms of 
China-  generated U.S. patents. Microsoft has nearly three times as many 
Fig. 13.4    China-  generated U.S. patents, 1981–2006
Source: Data are taken from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Oﬃce CASSIS CD-  ROM data-
base, December 2006 version.
Notes: China- generated U.S. patents are U.S. utility patents for which at least one listed inven-
tor was resident in China at the time of patent application. Purely Chinese patents are those 
patents for which all listed inventors have addresses in the People’s Republic of China. Purely 
Chinese patents of U.S. ﬁ  rms are “purely Chinese” patents assigned to a U.S. corporate en-
tity.534        Lee Branstetter and C. Fritz Foley
26. An interesting account of Microsoft’s early missteps in the PRC is provided by Khanna 
(1997). Poor relationships with the central government of the PRC ensured that rates of piracy 
of Microsoft products in China remained among the highest in the world for years.
27. In private conversations with the authors, some U.S. corporate managers have referred 
to the R&D centers opened by their ﬁ  rms in China as “PR&D” centers—that is, they were as 
much about public relations eﬀorts directed at a mainland regime reluctant to enforce intel-
lectual property rights as they were about “real” research and development.
China-  generated patents as IBM and Intel. After years of fractious rela-
tionships with the Chinese government, Microsoft sought to cultivate more 
harmonious ties with key government oﬃcials by opening multiple research 
centers in the People’s Republic of China (PRC).26 Microsoft lavished rather 
large sums of money on these facilities and sought to attract high-  proﬁ  le 
researchers to them, an eﬀort described at length in a recent book by Buderi 
and Huang (2006), Guanxi (The Art of Relationships). Senior Microsoft 
executives, including former CEO Bill Gates, have regularly reiterated their 
commitment to conducting world-  class research in China at the very fron-
tier of software technology. In the context of that public commitment, it 
is interesting to note that Microsoft’s China-  generated patents amount to 
less than 4 percent of its total cumulative patents to date.27 If we restrict 
ourselves to patents with solely Chinese inventor teams, this fraction drops 
to about 1.5 percent.
Table 13.10  Top ten generators of U.S. patents in China
Rank  Firm name   Nationality   Number of patents
1 Hon Hai/Foxconn Taiwan 644
2 Microsoft Corporation United States 151
3 Inventec Corporation Taiwan 94
4 China Petrochemical Taiwan 79
5 SAE Magnetics Japan 39
5 China Petroleum and 
Chemical Company
China 39
6 Huawei Technologies China 34
7 IBM United States 33
7 Winbond Electronics Taiwan 33
8 Intel United States 30
9 United Microelectronics Taiwan 27
10   Proctor and Gamble   United States  24
Notes: This table ranks ﬁ  rms based on the number of U.S. patents they generated through 
2006, which include at least one inventor with a mainland Chinese address. Patents are allo-
cated to ﬁ  rms on the basis of the assignee name that exists in U.S. patent records. Data are 
taken from the December 2006 version of the CASSIS CD-  ROM supplied by the U.S. Patent 
and Trademark Oﬃce. Hon Hai Precision Industries takes out U.S. patents under its oﬃcial 
name and under its English trade name, Foxconn. The reported numbers reﬂ  ect the sum of 
these patents. The numbers for Inventec Corporation represent the sum of patents taken out 
under the names of various subsidiaries. SAE Magnetics is a wholly-  owned subsidiary of 
TDK, a Japanese multinational.Facts and Fallacies about U.S. FDI in China    5 3 5
28. This section of the text reﬂ  ects the inﬂ  uence of Nicholas Lardy’s writings on this subject. 
Some of the facts and ﬁ  gures in the following paragraphs reproduce points made in Lardy’s 
presentations and in Branstetter and Lardy (2006, 2008).
Interestingly, the leading patent- generating ﬁ  rm in China, with more than 
four times Microsoft’s cumulated patent stock and a commanding lead over 
any indigenous mainland Chinese ﬁ  rm, is the Taiwanese contract manufac-
turing ﬁ  rm, Hon Hai, also known by its English trade name, Foxconn. Hon 
Hai is one of ﬁ  ve Taiwanese manufacturing ﬁ  rms to appear on this top ten 
list. As is the case with export-  oriented manufacturing, it appears the Tai-
wanese ﬁ  rms are more aggressively exploiting the opportunities to conduct 
research in China than are their U.S. counterparts.
Although the amount of innovative activity performed in China is lower 
than it is often perceived to be, the types of goods China exports are fairly 
technologically advanced. This has posed a puzzle to some economists. 
However, China is able to export huge quantities of high-  tech goods only 
because it imports most of the high value added parts and components 
that go into these goods.28 Figure 13.5 displays the level of Chinese exports 
and imports in electronic and information industry products. The domestic 
value added component of the value of exported electronic and information 
Fig. 13.5    China’s trade in electronics and information industry products, 1995–
2003
Source: Original data come from China Customs Statistics and the Chinese Ministry of Infor-
mation Industries (MII). The authors wish to thank Nicholas Lardy for provision of these 
data. A similar ﬁ  gure is presented in Branstetter and Lardy (2008).536        Lee Branstetter and C. Fritz Foley
29. An entertaining speciﬁ  c example of this is provided by Linden, Kraemer, and Dedrick 
(2007), who break down the production process for an Apple iPod, all of which are assembled 
in and exported from China. The authors’ careful, if incomplete, cost accounting suggests that 
Chinese value added represents at most a few dollars of the roughly $150 factory cost for the 
typical iPod.
30. In light manufacturing, in contrast, domestic content accounts for nearly 70 percent of 
the value of exports. See Anderson (2007) for a useful review of the most recent data.
technology products, while growing, remains quite low.29 Even in the most 
recent years for which data are available, more than 70 percent of the value 
of these exports is comprised of imported inputs.30
While U.S. multinationals, with a few exceptions, do not play a major role 
in Chinese exports of high-  tech goods, we also see in U.S. aﬃliate data a 
strong correlation in high-  tech industries between imports from the parent 
and sales. Regression analyses of aﬃliate sales on measures of imported inter-
mediates from the parent show a dramatically stronger connection for more 
R&D intensive industries, underscoring the relatively higher dependence of 
such activity in China on key inputs from the parent. Taken together, levels 
of R&D conducted in China, the amount of patenting associated with inno-
vation based in China, and the low Chinese value added in high- tech Chinese 
exports suggest that China is far from becoming a technological superpower 
that will be home to a large share of U.S. MNE innovative activity.
13.5    Conclusions
The emergence of China as an important trading economy has been one of 
the most signiﬁ  cant economic developments of our time, and it has captured 
the attention of the popular press. Understanding the economic changes in 
China while they are occurring is challenging, and several misconceptions 
about the role played by diﬀerent factors, especially the role played by U.S. 
FDI, have become widely held. In this paper, we attempt to address four 
commonly held views that we believe do not reﬂ  ect an informed interpre-
tation of available data. These relate to the size of U.S. FDI in China, the 
degree to which it is export oriented, the extent to which it displaces U.S. 
multinational activity elsewhere, and the amount of innovative activity that 
is associated with it.
Despite the size of the Chinese economy and its rapid growth, the scale 
of U.S. aﬃliate activity there remains modest. U.S. aﬃliates based in China 
account for less than 2 percent of total U.S. aﬃliate sales, they contribute 
relatively little to aggregate Chinese investment, and they play a surprisingly 
small role in mediating the expansion of U.S.- China trade. Partly because of 
their focus on the domestic market and partly because of the small scale of 
their operations, U.S. aﬃliates in China do not appear to have signiﬁ  cantly 
displaced investment elsewhere as they have increased the scale and scope 
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The limited level of U.S. aﬃliate activity in China does not indicate an 
unusual degree of aversion to China on the part of U.S. investing ﬁ  rms. 
Rather, it reﬂ  ects the fact that most U.S. aﬃliate activity takes place in coun-
tries that are not only large, but also that are geographically proximate to 
the United States, that have low levels of corruption, and that are wealthy. 
Controlling for GDP, distance, tax rates, corruption, and GDP per capita, 
U.S. MNE activity in China and the extent to which U.S. aﬃliates in China 
sell goods to the United States and other countries besides China are neither 
especially low, nor especially high.
Despite widespread interest in the possible emergence of China as a center 
of technological innovation, U.S. aﬃliates conduct relatively little R&D in 
the country, and aﬃliate activity in technology- intensive industries appears 
to remain quite dependent on the supporting activities of the parent ﬁ  rm. 
China’s ability to innovate, as evidenced by numbers of U.S. patents with at 
least one China-  based inventor, remains well behind the much more devel-
oped capabilities of other East Asian countries like Japan, Taiwan, and 
South Korea. The picture traced out by rapid changes in the structure of 
Chinese exports of an emerging technological superpower belies a more 
modest reality. China’s exports of high-  technology goods are still quite 
dependent on imported components, technology, and expertise.
Rapid growth of Chinese aggregate GDP, income per capita, and human 
capital is likely to motivate U.S. ﬁ  rms to continue to expand their base of 
activity there. Given that current levels of activity are much smaller than 
levels of activity elsewhere, the relative scale of aﬃliate activity in China is 
likely to remain modest for many years to come. However, if the pace of 
progress persists, some of today’s fallacies about U.S. FDI in China are 
likely to become facts.
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Comment  Stephen Yeaple
The foreign activities of American corporations have long been a source 
of concern to both the American public and to American policymakers. 
The list of potential concerns is long. Does the expansion of foreign pro-
duction capabilities abroad threaten the availability of jobs that have tra-
ditionally been ﬁ  lled by American citizens? Does the transfer of technolo-
gies by American corporations to their foreign aﬃliates result in the loss of 
American competitiveness in key industries? What impact does multina-
tional activity have on the balance of payments of the United States? It is 
concerns such as these that have motivated the careful collection of data by 
the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) over the last several decades 
the on the foreign activities of American multinationals. More recently, 
these traditional concerns about the foreign activities of U.S. multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) on the U.S. economy have been magniﬁ  ed by the rapid 
expansion of economic activity in China.
In this chapter, Professors Bramstetter and Foley argue that assertions fre-
quently made by commentators with respect to the activities of U.S. MNEs 
in China are false. These assertions essentially are of two types. According to 
the ﬁ  rst, the activities of U.S. MNEs have had a substantial impact on Chi-
nese economic development and its integration into the international trad-
ing system. According to the second, the activities of U.S. MNEs in China 